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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its
ENGINEERII\TG COMMISSION, D.
I-I. WHITTENBURG, Chairman, H.
l. CORLEISSEN and LAYTON
11AXFIELD, Members of the Engineering Cotnmission,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No. 8249

vs.

FRED TED·ESCO and KLEA B. TEDESCO, his wife, et al,
Defendants,
and

BIRD & EVANS, INC.
Counter-claimants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

INTRODUCTORY
This case was tried before a jury in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Hon. Ray Van
3
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Cott presiding. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the
counter claimants in the amount of $30,500.00. Thereafter the
Court entered an Order granting the Motion of the plaintiffs
and respondents for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
This appeal is taken from such Order.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
There is no dispute between the parties here as to whether
or not the appellants have been damaged by the condemnation
of the property taken for the c CThis is the Place'' monument.
The only question is whether or not such damages are compensable under the law.
Prior to the 11th day of July, 1951, Wagner Improvement
Company, a corporation which was organized for the purpose
of planning and developing certain properties belonging to
the Charles H. Deere estate, was the owner of approximately
180 acres of land on the eastern boundary of Salt Lake City.
Bird & Evans, Inc., the appellants herein, were the owners of
approximately 35 acres of land east of and immediately adjoining the land of Wagner Improvement Company (R. 70). The
map which is attached to this brief as an appendix shows the
relative location of these two tracts. In the middle 1940's, the
Wagner Improvement Company and the predecessors in interest of Bird & Evans, Inc., Mr. and Mrs. William Webb, set
about the work of planning and developing an exclusive subdivision to be known as Oak Hills Subdivision to cover both
the lands owned by the Wagner Improvement Company and
the lands owned by the Webbs (R. 71). During the course of
4
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the development, Bird & Evans, Inc., was formed, which company acquired the land from the Webbs, the W ebbs retaining
an interets therein.
The work of planning and development of the subdivision
went on uninterrupted by this transfer of title. Mr. Dean
F. Brayton, a Salt Lake attorney was Vice-President of Wagner Improvement Company and the manager of their activities
in the state of Utah. He was also attorney for the Webbs and
later became attorney for Bird & Evans, Inc., for the purpose
of carrying out the development ·of the subdivision. Mr. A. B.
Paulsen, an architect and subdividing consultant, was jointly
employed by the Webbs and the Wagner Improvement Company, and later, after Bird & Evans, Inc., came into existence,
Mr. Paulsen became a stockholder and officer in Bird & Evans,
Inc.
It was agreed between the owners of the two properties
that Mr. Paulsen and Mr. Brayton should represent both sides
in planning and carrying out the subdivision development (R.
78-79). It was further agreed that the costs of planning would
be divided between the owners of the two tracts of land in
proportion to their land holdings, and, in fact, the very considerable expense entailed in planning was so borne and was
so paid (R. 72). As to the installation of improvements on
the subdivision, it was agreed that the costs of installation of
these improvements would be borne by the owners of the lots
within the subdivision abutting the particular improvement in
question (R. 82). Restrictive covenants were drawn up by Mr.
Brayton and agreed upon by the owners of both properties
to be placed in effect as the plats were recorded and accepted

5
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in the office of the County Recorder. These restrictive covenants
appeared in evidence as Exhibit 8 and generally litnited use
of the property in question to high grade residence units, some
minor exceptions being made for comn1ercial areas. The work
of planning of said subdivision was completed son1etime prior
to July 11, 1951 and the work of development thereof was
underway at that time. Exhibits 1 to 7 inclusive are a few of
the many maps and drawings which were prepared en this
project. Exhibit 3 is a survey which was made by Mr. Thomas
Heath in 1948. Mr. Heath at the time of the tri~l was rightof-way agent for the state of Utah and appeared at all times
in court during the trial of this case as a representative of the
state of Utah.
From an examination of these exhibits, it is clear that
the Bird & Evans property and the Wagner Improvement property were considered by the planners as a single piece of property and planning and development work thereon was proceeding as if no difference in ownership existed. In fact it will
be seen from an examination of Exhibit 1 that along the border
line of the two tracts the lots were subdivided so that individual
lots lay partly in the Bird & Evans tract and partly in the
Wagner Improvement Company tract. No attention was paid
at all by the planners and developers to the property line between the two tracts. They proceeded as if it were not there
and as if the entire tract were of common ownership.
Because of the fact that the market could absord each
year only a limited number of lots of this high quality, and
because of the further fact that subdivided land generally
takes a higher valuation for tax purposes than does unsub-

6
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divided land, the planners and developers jointly agreed that a
plat of the entire subdivision should not be filed but that the
subdivision should be divided into a number of plats. Each
plat should be filed individually and should be developed and
placed on the market before an additional plat should be filed.
The restrictive covenants which it had been agreed should be
applicable to all plats were made of record as to each plat at
the time the plat in question was filed.
The Wagner Improvement Company property lay partly
on the north side and partly on the south side of Emigration
Cayon. The Bird & Evans property lay entirely on the south
side of the canyon. At the time of the filing of the condemnation action by the state on July 11, 1951, the plats to the area
lying north of the canyon had been recorded and partially
sold out. The plats on the area south of the canyon, those affecting both properties, had not yet been filed. Mr. Brayton
testified that he believed that the demand for residential property would have warranted the filing of these plants and the
installation of the improvements thereon in the year 1951
(R. 83). Mr. Wright and Mr. Benedict, expert witnesses for
the appellants, assumed in their appraisals that the plats
might not have been filed until 195 3 (R. 112). Mr. Werner
Kiepe, an expert witness, called by the state of Utah who
v1as well acquainted with demands for residential property of
this type, testified that in his opinion the demand for residential property was such that the owners of the property
would have proceeded with the development and sale on the
south side of the canyon, including the Bird & Evans property
in the year 1954 (R. 154).

7
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On July 11, 1951, the state instituted condemnation pro·
ceedings to condemn certain lands for the purpose of constructing a state park. They took substantially all of the Wag.
ner Improvement Company property on the north side of
the canyon, and a portion of that on the south including all
of the land which lay between the Bird & Evans property
and the existing residential area of Salt Lake City. The land
taken by the condemnation proceedings is shown on the appendix attached hereto. It will be noted from an examination
thereof that the condemnation action took the land right up
to, but not including the Bird & Evans property.
As has been stated before, all parties are agreed that as
a result of the condemnation of a portion of the subdivision
of which it was a part, the Bird & Evans property suffered
substantial damages. Mr. Werner Kiepe testified that in his
opinion as a direct result of the condemnation action the Bird
& Evans property had been diminished in value by $9,600.00.
Mr. Edward M. Ashton, another appraiser for the state, estimated the diminution in value at $14,000.00. Mr. Ralph
Wright and Mr. Joseph Benedict, appraisers for the appellants,
placed the figure for diminution of value at $58,000.00 and
$57,500.00 respectively. The jury determined the amount to
be $30,500.00.
The reason for this diminution in value of Bird & Evans
property as a result of the condemning of a portion of the
subdivision is obvious. Before the condemnation it had be.en
part and parcel of a large and exclusive subdivision for which
it had. contributed substantial sums of money for planning
and development. The restrictive covenants binding both upon
8
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it and the owners of the balance of the land in the subdivision required the use of the land only for high class residential purposes. The owners of the other lots were required
by this agreement to aid in and contribute to the installation
of the improvements which were necessary before the land
could be sold as subdivision property. Immediately after the
condemnation all of these advantages were gone. The money
spent for planning was down the drain. The advantages in
the installation of improvements resulting from the reciprocal
agreements were gone. If the owners of the Bird & Evans
property, or any other person that cared to purchase the property from them on the market, desired to use it for residential
purposes, its highest and best use, they had to start over with
planning and development. They had to bring utilities and
other improvements entirely at their own expense from a considerable distance in order to qualify the property for residential purposes. Obviously, as all parties agreed the market
value of the Bird & Evans property for residential subdivision
purposes was materially decreased.
The nature of the damage to the Bird & Evans property
was exactly the same in kind and character, although somewhat
more severe in degree, as the damage to the portion of the
Wagner Improvement property lying immediately south of
the portion condemned as shown on the appendix. The State
of Utah stipulated to a judgment against itself for the damages
to the above mentioned portion of the Wagner Improvement
tract not taken (see judgment of condemnation in the Deere
estate case attached to this record.*) They resist damages to the
Bird & Evans tract only on the ground of diversity of owner-

9
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•

ship, in spite of the fact that there existed the reciprocal agreements, in spite of the fact that they were all parts of a common subdivision and in spite of the fact that the damages were
exactly the same in nature.
(*Charles D. Wiman and Burton F. Peek, Trustees, appear as the owners of the Wagner Improven1ent Cotnpany
tract in the Decree as these trustees took the property over for
liquidation after condemnation was commenced because of a
tax advantage from .having the trustees liquidate rather than
the corporation.)

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT ONE
THE CLAIM OF THE COUNTERCLAIMANTS WAS
PROPERLY COGNIZABLE BEFORE THE COURT.

POINT TWO
THE COUNTERCLAIMANTS ARE ENTITLED TO
JUDGMENT FOR THE CONDEMNATION AND DESTRUCTION OF THEIR RECIPROCAL COVENANTS.

POINT THREE
THE COUNTERCLAIMANTS ARE NOT BARRED
FROM CLAIMING DAMAGES BY THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS.
10
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ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE CLAIM OF THE COUNTERCLAIMANTS WAS
PROPERLY COGNIZABLE BEFORE THE COURT.
In the respondent's Motion to Dismiss made to the court
immediate! y before trial of the action started, the first ground
of the Motion was that the appellant was not properly before
the court and that its remedy lay with the Board of Examiners.
This point has already been determined by this court on intermediate appeal in State v. Bird & Evans, Inc., 265 Pac. (2d)
639. There the court held that our counterclaim was properly
filed and that we were not precluded from recovering because
of the fact that the claim of Bird & Evans as to its property actually taken had been litigated to judgment.
Neither the case of Hjorth v. Whittenburg, 241 Pac. (2d)
907 or State v. District Court, Fourth Judicial District, 78 Pac.
( 2d) 502, have any applicability here. In Hjorth v. Whittenburg
the plaintiff was seeking a judgment against the road commissioners in a separate action. The court held that their remedy,
if any there was, lay with the Board of Examiners. In this
case, however, we are properly before the Court in an action
which the State itself started. We have filed our Counterclaim
under the provisions of Section 78-34-7 U.C.A., 1953, which
provides as follows:
HAll persons in occupation of, or having or claiming
an interest in, any of the property described in the complaint, or in the damages for the taking thereof, though
not named, may appear, plead and defend, each in respect to his own property or interest, or that claimed
11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

by him, in the sames manner as if nan1ed in the complaint.''
We are seeking to have our damages assessed under the provisions of Section 78-34-10, U.C.A., 1953 which provides as
follows:
ttThe court, jury or referee must hear such legal
evidence as may be offered by any of the parties to the
procedings, and thereupon must ascertain and assess:

( 1) The value of the property sought to be condemned and all improvements thereon appertaining
to the realty, and of each and every separate estate
or interest herein; and if it consists of different parcels, the value of each parcel and of each estate or
interest therein shall be separately assessed.

( 2) If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the damages
which will accrue to the portiop not sought to be
condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned and the construction
of the improvement in the manner proposed by the
plaintiff.
( 3) If the property, though no part thereof is
taken, will be damaged by the construction of the
proposed i~provement, the amount of such damages. * * * * "
Certainly if this court felt that we could not properly have
our claim for damages adjudicated by the courts, it would
have dismissed the action on the intermediate appeal and
would not have remanded it to proceed in accordance with
that opinion which held that the counterclaim was properly
filed. It may be that the state has abandoned this position as
counsel did not argue it strenuously, however, if it is urged

12
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in the answering brief, we will argue the question more extensively in a reply brief.

POINT TWO
THE COUNTERCLAIMANTS ARE ENTITLED TO
JUDGlVIENT FOR THE CONDEMNATION AND DESTRUCTION OF THEIR RECIPROCAL COVENANTS.
It is the position of appellants that the agreements reached
between the Wagner Improvement Company and Bird &
Evans gave each reciprocal rights in the other's property, which
rights have been condemned in this action. These reciprocal
rights having been condemned and extinguished, the resulting
damage is the diminution in value of the dominant tenancy.
Each tract of land had an interest in the other arising by contract and by a course of dealing over many years. This right
was to have the other lands devoted to residential purposes
and to have the other lands bear their proportionate share of
the costs of the development of the subdivision. These rights
constituted reciprocal covenants which are clearly property
rights.
In regard to the condemnation of reciprocal covenants and
the right of the owner of the land not taken to recover for
destruction of such reciprocal covenants, the following language is found in Volume 2 of Nichlos on Eminent Domain,
page 81:
(CThe rna jority view holds that such a restriction
often characterized as an equitable servitude consti-

13
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tutes property in the constitutional se~1s~ and mus.t be
compensated for if taken. Such restncttons constitute
equitable easements on the land restrict:d a.nd when
such land is taken for a public use that wlll v1olate the
restrictions, there is a taking of the property of the
owners of the land for the benefit of which the restrictions were imposed. The owners of such property cannot maintain proceedings for damages against the
original owner or enforce the restrictions against the
condemnor, but they are entitled to an award of compensation for the destruction of their easements."
The following language is found in 1 Lewis on Eminent
Domain 429:
((When property subject to a restrictive covenant is
taken for public use, the owner of the property for
whose benefit the restriction is imposed, is entitled to
compensation."
In the case of Johnstone v. Detroit G.H.&M. Railroad
Co., a Michigan case, reported at 222 N.W. 325, the court
stated:
((The principal question is whether because of the
proposed violations of the restrictions the state must
pay compensation to the owners of other lots in the
subdivision whose land is not actually and physically
taken under our Constitution, Article 13, No. 1, which
prohibits the taking of private property for public
use without just compensation therefor."
In disposing of this case the Court went on to say on
page 331:
((The claim of counsel for defendants that the destruction of the easements at bar is by virtue of police
power and not under the power of eminent domain is
answered by Allen v. City of Detroit, supra. Their con14
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tention that there is a difference in the character and
effect of the power of eminent domain when exercised
by the state than when usen by a municipality is not
tenable. It is the same attribute of sovereignty, whatever the agency through which it is exercised. * * * *''
"It is therefore held that owners of property in a
subdivision in which under a general plan the property
is restricted to specific uses and in which the restrictions
are valid, subsisting and enforcible against the lands
in the hands of private owners, are entitled to compensation upon the taking of any part of such subdivision
for public use in violation of such restrictions. That
aside from nominal damage for destruction of the easement, the compensation is measured by the actual
diminution in value of the premises of such owner
as a result of the use to which the property taken is put,
and that in determining such diminution the effect by
way of benefit as well as by way of injury of such use,
is to be taken into such account."
The state of New York is much more restrictive than is
the state of Utah in the question of what damages may be
recovered wl!ere no part of the land is taken. The state of Utah
will permit recovery where a railroad injures property by emitting cinders, smoke, vibration, etc. The state of New York
will not. However, in the case of Flynn v. New York, W & B
Ry Co., et al, 112 N.E. 913, the railroad was actually built
across a piece of property subject to a restrictive covenant
in favor of the plaintiff's property that the condemned property
would be used only for residential purposes. In allowing recovery in that case, the Court stated:
((These restrictive covenants create a property right
and make a direct and compensational the damages
which otherwise would be consequential and noncom-

15
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pensational. Radcliffs Ex'rs v. Mayor, etc. of Brooklyn,
4 N.Y., 195; 53 Am. Dec. 357; Uline v. N.Y.C. and
H.R.R.R. Co., 101 N.Y. 98; 4 N.E. 536; 54 Am.
Rep. 661. No matter how unpleasant a neighbor _the
railroad may prove, if it takes no property by physical
appropriation, it is not chargeable with damages for
impaired values due only to proximity. But something
in the nature of an easement of privacy over another's
land may be acquired by covenant in order that one
may live apart from the disagreeable sights and sounds
of business if one desires, and if that right has a value
and the railroad subtracts a portion thereof by building on the restricted land, it is difficult to conceive
why compensation should not follow. * * * *"
(The right of the property owner is measured by
the depreciation in value which his land sustains."
t

In the case of Britton v. School District, a Missouri case,
44 S.W. (2d) 33, the plaintiff was granted an injunction against
the school board to restrain the board from building a school
house on lands in violation of restrictive covenants until they
condemned the reciprocal rights of the owners of adjoining
lots.
A similar case was at issue in the case of State v.Mulloy,
also a Missouri case, reported at 61 S.W. (2d) 741. There the
court stated:
nThe plaintiffs in the injunction suit (relators here)
are owners of lots in University Heights Subdivision.
The defendant school district was proceeding to erect
and use buildings and grounds in such subdivision for
school purposes in violation of valid building restrictions excluding and prohibiting such use. It is the
well settled law of this state that where the deeds of
conveyance impose valid restrictions on the la11ds within

16
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a given area, then each lot and the owner of the same
has an easen1ent in each and all other lots affected by
the restrictions, which easement is a property right
to be protected by injunction at the owner's instance
restraining and preventing violations of the building
restrictions. Such building restrictions and the rights
arising therefrom are subordinate to the right of eminent domain and can be extinguished by condemnation proceedings. If that suit was between individuals,
the plaintiffs would be entitled absolutely to the injunctive relief prayed for and damages could be considered, but this defendant is clothed with the power
of eminent domain and may exercise that right by
condemnation and for that reason only this Court did
not grant at once and absolutely the injunction prayed
for. The easement in plaintiffs' favor in the land which
defendant proposes to use for school purposes is within
the protection of the constitutional provisions which
provide that private property cannot be taken for private use with or without compensation and that (private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation, such compensation shall
be ascertained by a jury or board of commissioners' in
the manner provided by law."
The same rule applies in Federal Courts. In the case of
U.S. v. Gossler, from the U. S. District of Oregon, reported
at 60 Fed. Supp. 971, the Court said:
((If payment were made for a specific interest such
as the fee title out of the aggregate, the Government
would abrogate the other interests without paying
monetary consideration therefor. Such a result does not
satisfy the demands of the amendment. The United
States is liable to the owner of easement appurtenant
in a suit condemning the fee of the servient estate."
17
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In the case of Town of Stamford v. Vuono, 14?, Atl. 245,
this same subject was treated by tpe court as follows:
((The plaintiff also contends that these restrictions,
insofar as they prohibit the erection of a high school
or other municipal building upon the restricted property, are void as against public policy. The argun1ent in
support of this contention is that no contractual agreement between the owners of property should be permitted to prevent the use of that property by an agency
of the state when its use is required in the exercise of
a governmental function, that to require the state to
make compensation for the right taken would interfere
with this governmental function, an~ therefore should
not be permitted. The fallacy of the argument lies
in the assumption of its minor premise that the requiremerit that the state compensate the owner of the dominant tenement for the taking of his interest in the
servient tenement actually interferes with the exercise
of any governmental function. There is, of course, a
clear distinction between the rights of the private
owner of land which is subject to a restrictive easement
and those of a governmental agency which requires
for public purposes the use of the land in violation of
the restriction. The private owner may not violate the
restriction; if he attempts to do so, he may be restrained
by injunction. The governmental agency may not be
restrained from making such use of the property as
the public purpose for which it is acquired may require,
but, if that involves the taking of private property, it
must make compensation for the same. When, therefore, property subject to a restrictive easement is taken
for a public use, it has been held that the owner of
the property for whose benefit the restrtiction is imposed is entitled to compensation. Ladd v. Boston,
151 Mass. 585, 24 N.E. 858, 21 Am. St. Rep. 481;
Flynn v. R.R., 218 N.Y. 140, 112, N.E. 913, Ann.
18
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Cas. 1918B, 588; Allen v. Detroit, 167 Mich. 464, 133
N.W. 317, 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 890; Peters v. Buckner,
288 Mo. 618, 232 S.W. 1024; and note to same in 17
A.L.R. 543; Kirby v. School Board (1896) 1 Ch. 43,7;
Long Eaton Recreation Co. v. Midland Ry. Co., (1902)
2 K. B. 574; 1 Lewis Em. Dom. (3rd Ed.), Sec. 224;
1 Nichols, Em. Dom. ( 2d) Sec. 121.
Fron1 the foregoing it appears that the law is well settled
to the effect that where the state condemns land which is subject to reciprocal covenants with other land, the owners of
the land not taken are entitled to recover damages if the
value of their land is diminished by the taking of the land
subject to the reciprocal agreement and the agreements thus
extinguished. In the next succeeding section, we will discuss
more at length the question of whether or not the Bird &
Evans and the Wagner tracts actually had reciprocal rights
one in the other which had been destroyed by this condemnation action.

POINT THREE
TI-IE COUNTERCLAIMANTS ARE NOT BARRED
FROM CLAIMING DAMAGES BY THE STATUTE OF

FRAUDS.
The state does not deny the existence of the agreement
between Bird & Evans and Wagner Improvement Company for
the development of the Oak Hills Subdivision. They merely
maintain that as such agreement created an interest in land
and was not reduced to writing it is within the provisions
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of the Statute of Frauds. It is true that the agreement between
the two companies was not reduced to a written document
subscribed by both parties and it is understandable why
that was not done. They had jointly hired legal counsel and
engineering services. Each had proceeded to pay its proportionate share of the same. The restrictive covenants were reduced to writing but had not actually been signed and filed
except as to the plats on the north side of the canyon. The
appellants, however, claim that the Statute of Frauds does not
constitute a defense for the State in this case for two reasons.
First: because the agreements are taken out of the Statute
of Frauds by substantial part performance; and Second: the
State not being a party to such agreements is not in a position
to rely on the Statute of Frauds as a defense.
It is the well settled law in this State that substantial
part performance of an oral agreement takes said agreement
from under the operation of the Statute of Frauds. In this
regard see Brinton v. Van Cott, 8 Ut 480; Lynch et al v.
Cogivlio et al, 17 Ut 106; and Van Natta v. Heywood et al,
57 Ut 376.
There has been substantial part performance in this case
of the agreement between the two parties. The planning work
on the entire subdivision was completed. Bird & Evans had
paid a proportionate part of this. Wagner Improvement Company had had advantage of this planning servic-e on the plats
which had actually been :filed and the lots sold prior to the
time of the condemnation action. Wagner Improvement Company, therefore, would have been in no position to back dov1n
from the agreement even had it so desired. The facts, how20
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ever, are clear that it would have been equally to the advantage
of Wagner Improvement Company and Bird & Evans, Inc.,
to go through with the subdivision had not the State intervened, therefore, it is inconceivable that there would have
been any repudiation of the contract by Wagner Improvement
Company even if there had been no part performance.
The State, however, is in no position to attack the contract between Wagner Improvement Company and Bird &
Evans, Inc., collaterally as they have attempted to do in this
action. It is a well settled rule of law that the defense of the
Statute of Frauds is not available to anyone not a party to the
contract.
In the case of Leibowitz v. Central National Bank, 60
N.E. (2d) 727, an action was brought against a third party
for wrongful interference with the performance of a contract.
The defendant claimed as a defense that the contract was
within the Statute of Frauds, and it, therefore, could not be
held liable for interfering with the contract. The situation is
almost an exact parallel to that presented here. In disposing of
that case, the Court stated:
((It is argued that plaintiff is prevented by Sec. 8384
General Code, The Statute of Frauds, from maintaining this action. That section might be available to a
defendant in an action between the parties. It is a
mere defense. It is not a matter of substance. With
it the defendant in this instance can have no concern
because in an action based upon the contract itself such
a defense might not have been alleged or insisted upon."
The same matter was before the Supreme Court of Wyo-
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ming in the case of Laverents v. Gattis, 150 Pac. (2d) 867. In
disposing of the contention, the Court stated:
uwe think, moreover, that the legal conclusions
which counsel for plaintiff draws from the fact that
no written assignment was made, are not well taken.
He states that tit is almost elementary that the assignment of a purchaser's interest under a land contract
must be in writing to be effective.' And he cites us,
among other cases, to Wilkie v. Womble, 90 N.C.
254; Connor v. Tippett, 57 Miss. 594. These cases are
not at all in point. They deal with the enforcement
of an oral contract relating to real estate as between
the parties themselves. We have no such case here.
In the case at bar, Tucker was a stranger to the oral
contract made between the plaintiff and the defendants.
It is a general rule that the defense of the statute of
frauds is personal and cannot be interposed by strangers
to the agreement. 27 C.J. 304; 37 C.J.S., Frauds,
Statute of, Sec. 391, p. 715. In 49 Am. Jur. 896, it is
stated:
{The defense of the statute of frauds is a personal
one available only to a party to the contract to which
the statute is alleged to apply and his representatives
and privies. The statute is intended for the protection
of the party sought to be charged. It does not make it
inherently wrong for a party to enter into an oral
contract concerning a subject matter coming within
the meaning of the statute. In fact, in most jurisdictions, by its terms or by necessary implication, the
statute merely makes an oral contract voidable as a
protection to those who might otherwise suffer by reason of pretended oral promises; generally, it may be
said that the statute is not intended to be the means of
preventing voluntary fulfilment of a moral obligation
created by the oral agreement. Its benefits cannot be
claimed by one who is not a party or privy to the oral
C(
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contract and is not sought to be charged personally
on such contract.
'As has been said, it does not rest with a stranger
to say that the parties to the oral agreement will not
abide by the same regardless of the statute; it is for
the party himself (or his privy) to decide whether
he shall avail himself of the defense. If he feels that
he should discharge the moral obligation although he
may have a perfect legal defense, no stranger or third
party not privy to the contract can complain. This rule
applies even under statutes which provide that such
agreements are void unless reduced to writing and
signed by the party charged. It ordinarily prevents even
creditors of a party to the contract from asserting the
benefit of the contract.' "
n

To this same effect see also U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Mills,
146 F (2d) 694; Bradley v. Hall, an Alabama case, 195 So.
883; Sun Insurance Co. v. Thomas (Ky.) 90 S.W. (2d) 675,
Weitz v. Gordon (Miss) 184 So. 798; Alder v. Pilot Ind., 57
N.Y. Sup (2d) 539; Caldwell v. Caldwell (Tenn) 133· S.W.
(2d) 1009.

CONCLUSION
Once again we repeat the question here is not whether
the counterclaimants have been damaged. Everyone agrees
that they have been damaged, and the jury, having heard the
conflicting evidence as to the amount, fixed the figure at
$30,500.00. The only question is whether or not the damages
are of such a nature as to be compensable. The State has admitted in its Stipulation with the Deere estate that such dam-
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ages would be compensable if the land were in comn1on ownership. It is the position of the appellants that the diversity of ownership makes no difference here because of the recoprical rights
held by the owners in each others' lands due to the joint
agreements and the work done on planning and developing
of Oak Hills Subdivision. These agreements were valid and
subsisting and are taken out of the Statute of Frauds by substantial performance. Further the State is not in a position
to rely on the Statute of Frauds as a defense in this case.
Therefore, it appears that the Court was in error in granting the
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and that
that this Court should order the verdict of the jury reinstated.
Respectfully submitted,
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON

Attorneys for Appellants
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